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Abstract: 
Cross-country evidence on sub-central governments’ responses to cuts in grants received 
from central government shows the typical response is to adjust expenditure rather than 
offset cuts by raising ‘own’ revenues.  Spending cuts are focused on the wage bill and, 
disproportionately, on capital expenditure. Even where countries have greater flexibility 
to offset the centrally imposed cuts, through a high degree of expenditure 
decentralisation, tax and borrowing autonomy, they tend not to exercise these powers. So, 
centrally imposed cuts result in expenditure restraint at the sub-central level, but the 
adjustment appears to suffer from short-termism, given the disproportionate focus on 
capital spending. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationships between different levels of government, and particularly their 
interactions, have been the subject of considerable scrutiny in recent years. There are 
broadly two strands to this literature. The first examines the optimal assignment of public 
service provision, and how this is financed, between different levels of government. This 
is the classic literature on fiscal federalism, a recent survey is provided in Oates (1999). 
The 'tax assignment problem', and the degree to which decentralized states use 
intergovernmental grants, tax sharing schemes, sub-central taxes and user charges, 
respectively, has been an important area of debate. A number of interesting issues have 
been identified within this broad area, primarily in studies that examine how different 
levels of government deploy grants, share taxation revenues, and react to changes in the 
balance between central government grants and local revenues. For instance, a number of 
researchers have studied and interpreted the so-called 'fly-paper effect', whereby spending 
by lower levels of government increases more markedly in response to increases in 
intergovernmental grants than in response to increases in locally raised revenues (see 
Gramlich, 1977, Oates, 1994, Hines and Thaler, 1995). This literature has been developed 
further in studies that examine whether lower levels of governments react differently to 
increases and decreases in intergovernmental grants. Gramlich (1987) suggests that a 
significant asymmetry is evident in US state and local government behavior. However, 
evidence against this 'super-fly-paper effect' is presented in Gamkhar and Oates (1996). 
 
A second broad strand relates to macroeconomic management in multi-tiered 
governments. This literature is rather less developed, although it has received recent 
attention from the OECD (see Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003), and in academic studies 
(see Triesman, 2000, Rodden, 2002 and Rodden and Wibbels, 2002). This body of work 
emphasizes that the increasing tendency towards both decentralization and fiscal 
federalism and raises the issue of how to maintain sustainable public finances in this 
framework.  
 
A number of industrialized economies have adopted fiscal coordination mechanisms to 
address this problem directly, as surveyed in Joumard and Kongsrud (2003). The 
mechanisms discussed range from formal sub-national fiscal rules (e.g. expenditure and 
borrowing ceilings) to informal coordination mechanisms. A key issue here concerns the   2
incentives faced by multi-tiered fiscal authorities. For instance, the problem of 'soft 
budget constraints' faced by lower tiers of government has attracted considerable attention 
in some countries (e.g. Germany, Italy). Rodden (2003) highlights how the possibility of 
cost-shifting can lead to expectations of budget bailouts for the fiscally weaker German 
Lander, and Bordignon (2000) demonstrates that in Italy the decentralization of essential 
services (health) has led to weak budgetary controls in the expectation of a central 
government bailout. 
 
Much of the empirical evidence on the way in which sub-central governments react to 
changes in central government policies has focused on individual countries, particularly 
the US. However, the contribution of sub-central governments to attempts by central 
government to adjust their overall fiscal stance does seem to be an important issue in 
many OECD countries. In Darby et al. (2005a and 2005b) we show that quantitatively, 
sub-central tiers of government play a significant role in overall fiscal consolidation 
attempts. 
 
In this paper we focus on a natural experiment which allows us to explore how sub-
central tiers of government react to major discretionary shifts in intergovernmental grants 
offered by the central level
1. Specifically, we construct a panel dataset for the major 
OECD economies and use Event Analysis to assess how components of sub-central 
expenditure and revenue respond to cuts in central government grants. We examine the 
extent to which sub-central governments adjust expenditures and/or use their own fiscal 
powers (where available) to offset the cuts in their grant allocations. In addition we group 
countries using key characteristics to test whether particular patterns are applicable to 
certain individual defined groups of countries. 
 
In a companion paper, Darby et al. (2005b) we analyzed the behavior of sub-central 
governments during national fiscal consolidation attempts. We found that the sub-central 
tier play a significant role in consolidation episodes and that grants allocated by central to 
sub-central government play a critical role in central control of fiscal balances at the sub-
 
1      Whilst it is difficult to analyse these issues in countries where the relationship between tiers of 
government has changed over time, we do take steps to account for major shifts in fiscal responsibility 
that have occurred during our sample.   3
central level. In this paper we investigate pay closer attention to precisely how cuts in 
grants impact on the adjustment decisions made by lower tiers of governments.  
 
Our paper highlights a number of points. First, in response to, and in some cases, in 
anticipation of, cuts in their grants, sub-central governments tend to undertake significant 
and prolonged downward adjustments in their expenditure. In some respects this is akin to 
the 'fly-paper effect'
2 working reverse. Second, we observe that a substantial proportion of 
the overall adjustment to sub-central expenditures is borne by cuts in capital investment 
programs. This result is consistent with evidence presented in Darby et al. (2005a). There 
we found that, during attempted fiscal consolidation episodes, a disproportionate amount 
of the overall sub-central contribution to consolidation attempts is accounted for by cuts 
in capital expenditure. Again this might reasonably be interpreted as a variant of the 
effect identified by Gramlich (1987) with sub-central governments apparently seeking to 
defend current service provision, and maintaining their spending on wages, rather than 
defending spending on infrastructure. Third, our results do not appear to offer strong 
support for the effect identified by Gramlich (1987) in the USA: sub-central governments 
do not tend to react to cut-backs in grants by raising own source revenues significantly. 
This failure to replenish revenues by raising sub-central taxation and user charges 
probably reflects the fact that the states/regions and local authorities in many of the 
OECD countries in our sample face less autonomy in varying their taxation revenues than 
US states. Finally, when we disaggregate by the degree of decentralization, tax and 
borrowing autonomy we observe that not only do sub-central governments react to a cut 
in grants by cutting expenditures, but remarkably those countries with structures that are 
more decentralized and apparently involve greater fiscal autonomy, tend to cut 
expenditures by a greater amount, and seem reluctant to raise sub-central taxes. This 
reverse 'fly-paper effect' might highlight either a low degree of effective fiscal autonomy, 
or a high effective degree of tax competition at sub-central level which serves to limit any 
offsetting increase in local taxation.   
 
2    It should be stressed that originally (Gramlich, 1977) the term 'fly-paper effect' was used to describe 
the observation that the expenditure stimulus to local public expenditures from unconditional grants 
was in excess of equal increases in private income. However, since then, empirical studies (see e.g. 
Gamkhar and Oates, 1996, and Oates, 1999) have associated the term 'fly-paper effect' with tests of the 
extent to which changes in government grants impact on local expenditures without reference to 
changes in private income.   4
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section II we discuss the data 
and the scope of the study. In Secion III we discuss the econometric methodology we 
employ. Section IV presents our key results and Section V concludes. 
 
II.  SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
The data used in our study are annual and are taken primarily from the IMF's Government 
Financial Statistics (GFS), 2002 Edition, supplemented with data from the OECD 
Statistical Compendium, 2002 Edition. GFS provides the best internationally comparable 
data on fiscal variables for fifteen OECD countries that is disaggregated by tier of 
government
3, subdividing these between three levels (central, state and local categories). 
This allows us to construct an unbalanced panel dataset with 336 observations covering 
the period 1970-99. A full description of the data is provided in an Appendix. The dataset 
covers not only federal, but also unitary countries. In practice, as we show in Darby et al. 
(2003) the distinction between these two categories in terms of the devolution of spending 
and financing arrangements is not as clear-cut as one might think. 
 
The dataset used does have some weaknesses. An obvious one is that little or no 
distinction is made between tax revenues from taxes, where the sub-central tiers control 
both the tax rates and/or the tax base, and revenues from tax sharing arrangements. 
However, we have been able to supplement our data to take into account the extent of 
independent taxing powers available to sub-central tiers using OECD (1999) for the 
majority of countries and information provided by Jonathan Rodden of MIT in the cases 
of Canada and the USA. In our empirical work we use this additional data
4 to distinguish 
between countries in terms of their differing degrees of fiscal autonomy. 
 
Another potential weakness is that, to the extent that central government's can exert 
influence on sub-central spending patterns through directives (see Ebel and Yilmaz, 
 
3     Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA. 
4      Unfortunately, no such data appears to be readily available for Australia and France, so in the 
extensions to the basic analysis that involve fiscal autonomy data we have to drop some sample 
observations.   5
2002), GFS will overstate the true nature of sub-central expenditure autonomy. 
Nonetheless, the GFS data remain the best available for our purposes. 
 
III.  ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
Event studies provide a regression based method of examining the time profile of key 
variables of interest around the occurrence of defined events, in our case cuts in grants 
received by sub-central governments. Event studies are relatively uncommon in 
macroeconomics, but fairly commonplace in finance
5. Here we use event study analysis 
to compare and contrast significant changes in key fiscal variables before, during, and 
after a year in which central to sub-central grant cuts occurred, as compared to 'normal' or 
reference conditions. This allows us to obtain the predicted time profile for each of the 
fiscal variables (expressed as percentages of GDP) immediately prior to, during and 
following the cut. More specifically, each event window comprises four years; one year 
prior to the period of cut in grants, the event period itself, and the two years that follow. 
The length of the event window is a choice variable, and was chosen based upon the 
significance of the time dummies in the full set of regressions. Our results suggest that the 
window encompassing one year prior to the cut and two years after is appropriate
6. 
 
The econometric methods we employ are similar to those employed by Tornell and 
Westermann (2002) in an analysis of business cycles around the time of financial crises. 
We apply panel methods, where the panel regressions include fixed effects to account for 
cross-country heterogeneity and use Weighted Least Squares (WLS) to account for the 
effects of heteroscedasticity
7. Each fiscal variable is regressed over the entire sample (for 
 
5   See for instance MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. (1997). For example, in finance these methods 
are used to examine the impact of 'news', such as the announcement of profit figures, on share prices 
in the immediate and surrounding periods. 
6    Initially we experimented with an event window which included two years prior to the cut in grants. 
However, the dummy variable in this period were never significant in the regressions and hence we 
have chosen to narrow the event period and eliminate the T-2 dummy from this analysis. 
7    In a recent paper Bertrand et al. (2004) note that 'difference in differences' estimates might be affected 
by the presence of serial correlation. Although our study is not a conventional 'difference in 
differences' study, the presence of serial correlation may result in inconsistent standard error estimates. 
In order to check if this is a problem, we conducted two robustness checks: first we added a lagged 
dependent variable to our event study regressions; and second, we re-estimated our regressions using a 
GLS (Cochrane-Orcutt) estimator. In all cases we found little change in the sign, size and significance 
of the time dummy variables. We continue to report the OLS estimates because of the difficulty in 
plotting event windows in the presence of lagged dependent variables. We are grateful to our   6
all countries, i, and all time periods, t) on a series of time dummies designed to capture 
the time profile of the variables. More precisely, the coefficients on the time dummies 
capture the differences between each period in the event window and the reference years. 
 
The “event” periods are identified as years in which there was a cut in sub-central 
governments’ grant receipts as a percentage of their previous period total revenue. This 
allows us to focus on all real terms cuts in grants and provides a total of 88 events in our 
dataset. From this we excluded two episodes, those relating to the UK in 1990/91, and 
Spain in 1985/86. In both these cases the adjustments in grants were linked to major 
reforms in local government finance. The chronology of the identified grant cuts is 
provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Chronology of Grant Cuts 
  Year of cut in grants  
USA 1983 
UK  1977, 78, 79, 80, 82, 85, 88, 93, 95, 97 & 98 
Austria  1985 & 89 
Belgium  1981, 82, 87, 88, 89, 92, 96 & 97 
Denmark  1981, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 95, 96 & 97 
France  1984 & 96 
Germany  1976, 77, 81, 82, 83, 93,94,95,97 & 98 
Netherlands  1980, 84, 86, 87, 89, 93, 94 & 96 
Norway  1977, 93, 95 & 96 
Sweden  1978, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 91, 94, 95, 96 & 99 
Canada  1980, 84, 86, 88, 93, 95, 96 & 97 
Finland 1993 
Ireland  1984, 86, 88, 89 
Spain 1997 
Australia  1982, 86, 87, 88 89, 94 
Total 88 
Source:  
Identified using sample averages of data from IMF Government Financial Statistics 
 
We carry out two sets of regressions. First we examine all episodes of grant cuts 
collectively, where T denotes the actual year of cut in grants. 
 
  yD D D D D it i iT iT iT iT iT it ,, , , , , , =+ + + + + + −− + − + α β β β β β ε 12 21 3 4 1 52 4  (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                
discussant at the NBER/CESifo TAPES ‘Fiscal Federalism’ conference, Thiess Buettner, for pointing 
this issue out to us.   7
 
where yit is the fiscal variable of interest in country i at period t, and Di,t+j are time 
dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the period where the cut takes place, and zero in 
all other periods. We focus on a variety of different variables: total expenditure, taxation, 
fees and user-charges, the wage bill, social transfers, expenditure of goods and services, 
and capital expenditure. 
 
Since grant cuts appear in the sample regardless of size we also divide the events into two 
categories; 'large' and 'small' cuts in grants. One issue this allows us to investigate is 
whether there is some form of non-linear effect present that cannot be captured in the 
initial regressions. For instance it might be possible, given a certain degree of fiscal 
autonomy, for a sub-central government to react to a small cut in their grant allocation by 
raising their tax revenues. It might be less feasible to accommodate a large cut in their 
grant in this way and a significant cut in sub-central expenditure might be the only 
available response. It’s also possible that large and small cuts in grants might be sustained 
to different extents, and this too should have an impact on the likely response. For 
example, if large grant cuts tend to be reversed in subsequent periods we would expect 
them to have a different impact on the behaviour of sub-central governments from that of 
a series of small but sustained cuts.  
 
In order to check whether the results are affected by the size of the grant cut we ranked 
the 86 cuts by size and then sub-divided them into two equal sub-samples representing 
‘large’ and ‘small’ cuts respectively. The largest cuts averaged 2.77% of total sub-central 
government revenues, whilst the smallest cuts averaged 0.59% of total revenues.  To 
investigate whether grant cuts are sustained or temporary and reversed we can note that 
on average, in the year following a large cut, grants are only increased by 0.1%. Small 
cuts tend to be partially but not wholly reversed, with an average post cut increase of 
0.27%. 
Having subdivided the events in this way we then perform the following event study 
regression: 
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where again yi,t is the fiscal variable of interest in country i at period t, DIP j
S
, ±  are time 
dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the period when the small cut in grants took 
place (denoted t=T) and zero in all other periods, and DIQ j
L
, ±  are time dummies, equal to 1 
in +j/-j periods from the period in which the large cut in grants took place (denoted t=V) 
and zero in all other periods. 
 
Each estimated coefficient (βk, δk, ζk) captures the estimated difference between period k 
in the event window and the average position in non-consolidation years. Thus, for 
instance, if the dependent variable is the annual change in sub-central government 
expenditure, a significantly negative βi implies that in the year prior to the cut in grants, 
the change in sub-central expenditure was significantly lower than in years when grants 
were not cut (the 'normal', or reference period). 
As we shall see below, having estimated the standard event study regression it is useful to 
test whether individual countries or groups of countries display significantly different 
behavior from the rest of the countries in the event sample. For instance, we might wish 
to consider whether different levels of sub-central fiscal autonomy respond differently 
from each other. Or we might want to analyze the significance of borrowing autonomy in 
determining whether sub-central governments display a different adjustment pattern. 
Equation 1 can be modified to incorporate tests of these hypotheses by including an 
interactive dummy variable: 
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where Cl is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity in the case of a particular 
country or group of countries and is equal to zero in all other cases.  
The estimated coefficient on the interactive dummy variable captures the additional effect 
of this category of country over and above that identified by the standard dummies. For 
instance, taking the previous example, if Cl is a dummy representing countries with high 
levels of sub-central fiscal autonomy, a significantly negative λ1 would indicate that in the 
year of the cut in central government grants, sub-central expenditure is significantly lower 
in countries with high as opposed to low fiscal autonomy.   9
Another key econometric issue relates to the potential endogeneity of the grant cut and 
the causal link implied by the event study. We essentially make the implicit assumption 
that grants cuts instigated by central government are determined exogenous and as 
causing reactions by sub-central governments. However, if in fact central grants adjust in 
response to the expenditure or taxation decisions made by sub-central governments this 
approach would be questionable
8. Gamkhar and Oates (1996) take account of potential 
endogeneity by instrumenting the cut in grants variable in their regressions. However, 
instrumenting is not an option in the event study regressions since the potentially 
endogenous variable, the cuts in grants, do not actually enter the regression. The question 
instead is whether one should test and adjust for the potential endogeneity when 
determining the periods in which exogenous cuts in grants have occurred. This requires a 
slightly different approach. We have looked at auxiliary regressions in which the actual 
change in grants is regressed on lagged changes in grants and a set of variables identified 
as potential instruments by Gamkhar and Oates (1996). From these auxiliary regressions 
we are able to generate estimated exogenous cuts in grants (using predicted rather than 
actual changes in grants). This approach does lead to some minor changes in the episodes 
identified. However, a check of the subsequent event study regressions indicates little 
difference to the estimated signs and sizes of the time dummy coefficients and their 
standard errors so suggests that there is very little change in our key results and so little 
empirical significance of the potential endogeneity problem
9. Finally,  even if one does 
not accept a strong causal link for all the cuts in grants events identified, the event study 
can still be seen as uncovering empirical regularities "stylized facts" that in some cases 
are likely to be picking up causal effects. 
 
IV.  RESULTS 
 
We present our key results in the form of a series of charts that show how the fiscal 
variables for the sub-central governments behave in proximity of the cuts in centrally 
 
8   For instance, excessive sub-central expenditure or reductions in sub-central taxation might lead to 
increases in intergovernmental grants. 
9   To be precise, our auxiliary regressions involve cuts in grants regressed on lagged changes in grants,  
some conditioning economic variables (lagged unemployment, output) and a set political variables 
(political party in power, type of government using the data from Woldendorp et al., 2000). We then 
used these regressions to identify predicted cuts in grants, and used the predicted cuts to re-run the 
event study regressions. The signs, sizes and standard errors of the time dummies were very similar 
and hence accounting for endogeneity would not seem to alter the results in a major way.   10
allocated grants. The upper row of graphs in each panel shows the time profile for the 
fiscal variable of interest for, respectively, all cuts in grants, large cuts in grants and small 
cuts in grants. Alongside the coefficients we also plot the standard error bands which 
allow easy identification of the time periods in which the time profile implies a change 
which is significantly different from zero. The lower row of graphs in each panel shows 
the cumulative change in the fiscal variable of interest over the event window. This is 
obtained by summing the respective coefficients over all periods. We also show 
asymptotic standard error bands for these cumulative effects. 
 
A number of points emerge from these initial results.  First, it is apparent from Figure 1 
that cuts in grants are followed by significant and sustained cuts in total sub-central 
expenditures. There is also evidence that some of these cuts are anticipated since the T-1 
dummy variable is significant. This anticipation effect might be the result of pre-
announced or signaled changes in the policies of central governments. Second, as 
highlighted in Figure 2, sub-central governments also tend to raise taxation revenues 
significantly in the period of a cut in their grant allocation. Notice that the estimated 
increase in sub-central tax revenue is significant at time T for all grant cut episodes, but 
that the response tends to be immediate for large cuts in grants, and delayed (to T+1) for 
small cuts. Also note that while there is some evidence that the tax effect is not actually 
sustained following large grant cuts, small cuts appear to have an impact that gradually 
builds up over time. Figure 3 shows that there is little evidence that non-taxation revenues 
(from fees and user charges) are used to offset the cuts in grants. 
 
Figure 1: Sub-Central Total Expenditure 
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Figure 2: Sub-Central Taxation Revenue 














































































































































































Figure 3: Sub-Central Non-Taxation Revenue 






































































































































































































In summary, there appears to evidence of a significant shift towards revenue from sub-
central taxation in response to grant cuts, although this is delayed in the case of small cuts 
and appears to be at least partially reversed in response to large cuts in grants. In terms of 
overall size, the impact on taxation is less than that on expenditure. In general this 
supports the notion that the 'fly-paper effect' operates in both directions, in that local 
governments choose not to fund certain expenditures if they have to provide funds from 
their own taxes. These results seem to corroborate those presented by Gamkhar and Oates 
(1996),  but  contrasts with Gramlich (1987).  
 
Turning to our results based on further disaggregation of the expenditure data. Figure 4 
provides some evidence of cuts in sub-central expenditure on goods and services,   12
although the cumulative plots show that these are reversed and back to base levels by 
T+2.  
 
Figure 4: Expenditure on Goods and Services 
























































































































































































Figure 5 shows that there is only a small impact on social transfers, which is to be 
expected since the criteria for the majority of social welfare expenditures are nationally 
set and the payments themselves are generally the responsibility of central governments.  
 
Figure 5: Sub-Central Social Transfers 



































































































































































Figure 6 shows that the impact of cuts in grants on the sub-central government wage bill 
is significant at time T. When separating the cuts by size we discover that cuts in the 
wage bill are large and significant at T and T+1 in the case of large cuts in grants. The 
impact on the wage bill is only marginally significant at T for small cuts, and the   13
cumulative changes are never significantly below the starting point for the duration of the 
event window. So it would appear that large grant cuts are required to induce significant 
reductions in the sub-central government wage bill. 
 
Figure 6: Sub-Central Wage Bill 







































































































































































Figure 7 shows that cuts in sub-central governments’ capital spending, along with the 
wage bill, constitute a large proportion of the overall expenditure adjustment. Again the 
T-1 event dummy is significant, so it would appear that some cuts are brought forward 
ahead of the actual cuts in grants.  Overall, Figure 7 shows that a substantial tightening 
takes place across the event window, and the size of the cuts is even more significant 
when one considers that capital expenditure tends to constitute a relatively small 
proportion of total expenditure at the sub-central level, ranging from 6.24% in Canada to 
28.7% in France over our sample period (see Table 2), so the cuts observed here make 
particularly large dents in total sub-central capital expenditure. 
 
The cumulative results shown in Figure 7 indicate that small grant cuts account for more 
significant cuts in capital expenditure that are sustained for longer. The adjustments that 
follow large grant cuts appear to be temporary, and almost totally reversed by the end of 
the event window.  
 
Overall, these results suggest that the major impact of cuts in grants appear to fall on the 
sub-central government wage bill and on capital expenditure and on tax finance. It would 
seem that sub-central governments use these adjustments to help defend the provision of   14
public goods and services at pre-cut levels. These results concur with our findings from 
studying episodes of fiscal consolidation (Darby et al. 2005a, and b). 
 
Figure 7: Sub-Central Capital Expenditure 








































































































































































Table 2: Sub-Central Capital Expenditure as a % of Total Sub-Central Expenditure 
 Canada  6.24
 Denmark  7.87
 Sweden  8.47
 USA  10.17
 Norway  12.28
 Finland  12.47
 Netherlands  13.78
 Belgium  14.22
 UK  15.86
 Ireland  17.40
 Germany  19.09
 Australia  19.33
 Spain  22.67
 Austria  23.08
 France  28.72
Source: sample averages of data from IMF Government Financial Statistics 
 
For the remainder of this paper we investigate whether these general conclusions are 
robust and consider whether they should be modified through grouping countries by key 
characteristics. In particular we investigate whether there are significant differences in the 
responses in countries that might be explained by the extent to which sub-central 
governments depend on grant finance and also the extent to which classifying countries   15
by their degrees of expenditure decentralization, tax autonomy and borrowing autonomy  
impacts on our results. 
 
IV.1   Dependence on Central Government Grants 
 
In Table 3 we have divided the sample into a small group of five countries (the UK, Spain 
(post-1985)
10, Belgium, Ireland and The Netherlands) that exhibit a ‘high’ degree of 
dependence on central government grants, specifically those with grants representing 
more than  50% of total revenues, and the rest, with grant dependence below 50%. 
 
Table 3: Ranking by Grant Dependence: 
(grants as % of total sub-central revenues) 
Countries with Low Grant Dependence 











Countries with High Grant Dependence 
UK 55.74 




Source: sample averages of data from IMF Government Financial Statistics 
 
Figures 8-14 show the changes in the various fiscal variables following a cut in central 
government grants with the results separately identified for the counties with ‘high’ and 
‘low’ grant dependence respectively. A striking feature of these results is that those least 
dependent on grants seem to cut expenditure more (i.e. there is a stronger reverse fly 
paper effect). It would appear that greater fiscal autonomy does not result in a willingness 
 
10    Given that Spain underwent major reforms in the financing of sub-central governments in the 1980s, 
we have divided the observations for Spain into two groups, those relating to the pre-1985 reforms 
period, where Spanish sub-central governments depended less on central grants, and the post-1985 
period.   16
to offset grant cuts through an increase in sub-central tax revenues. Those countries least 
dependent on grant finance appear to be even more responsive in cutting all categories of 
expenditure – on goods and services, transfers and the wage bill and capital expenditure. 
 
Figure 8: Total Expenditure  Figure 9: Taxation Revenue 







































































































































































































































Figure 10: Non-Tax Revenues 
 



































































































































Figure 11: Expenditure on Gds & Svs   Figure 12: Social Transfers 


























































































































































































































Figure 13: Wage Bill  Figure 14: Capital Expenditure 

























































































































































































































These results are strongly suggestive of different reactions being elicited from sub-central 
governments depending on their institutional settings. In the next section we investigate 
which countries and what institutional features are the key driving factors generating 
these results. 
 
IV.2  Exploring the responses of Individual Countries 
 
One way to examine how individual countries react is to introduce interactive dummies in 
the event study regressions (see equation 3). The significance of these individual country 
interactive dummies allows us to judge whether individual countries display a behavior 
which is significantly different from the others. Two countries, Finland and Spain, had to 
be dropped from this analysis since there were too few observations of grant cuts in the 
sample to allow discrimination. For the remaining countries we were able to use these 
additional regressions to check whether the profile of the fiscal variables evolves along a 
significantly higher or lower path than for the remaining group. In general there were few 
significant differences among the countries to report, however some consistent results do 
emerge
11. In particular, Belgium shows a lesser cut in expenditure relative to the 
reference value, Canada and the US display a smaller increase in taxation, and Austria 
and France showed a larger increase in taxation and higher expenditure, following cuts in 
grants episodes. Germany and France also displayed a significantly larger cuts in capital 
 
11   These results are not tabulated for reasons of space. However, the results are available from the 
authors on request.   18
spending, but Austria significantly less. In the UK, sub-central governments seem to 
anticipate cuts in grants and enact bigger cuts in expenditure at T-1. 
 
In order to obtain more informative results, which use up less degrees of freedom, we 
next tried grouping the countries into different categories, depending on the institutional 
features of their fiscal arrangements. 
 
IV.3  Institutional Arrangements and Responses to Grant Cuts 
Table 4 shows the ranking of the countries in our dataset by expenditure decentralization. 
A greater degree of decentralization in spending should presumably allow sub-central 
governments greater scope to adjust to a cut in grants.  
 
Table 4: Ranking by Expenditure Decentralization 
(s-c expenditure as % of total govt. expenditure) 
 
Least Decentralized Countries 
Belgium 11.82 





Spain  (post-1985)  27.83 
Austria 30.73 









Source: sample averages of data from IMF Government Financial Statistics   19
The second grouping we investigate is based upon the degree of tax autonomy using 
information form OECD (1999) and Rodden (2002), see Table 5. There are two caveats 
with this data that we should note. The first is that we have had to lose observations for 
France and Australia since we have yet to find suitable data sources for these countries. 
The second is that the reference date for the OECD measures of tax autonomy is fixed at 
1995. Nonetheless, given the available data this allows us to check whether those 
countries in which sub-central governments have greater tax autonomy react differently in 
response to cuts in central government grants. 
 
Table 5: Ranking by Tax Autonomy 
     
  s-c tax  revenues as 




% of s-c taxation for 
which s-c controls 




‘own taxes’ as % of total 
s-c revenues 
(C) = (A) x (B) /100 
Countries with greatest tax autonomy 
Sweden 61.47  100  61.47 
Canada 56.41  86  48.51 
Finland 49.53  89  44.08 
Denmark 43.75  95  41.56 
USA 47.46  76  36.07 
 Countries with least tax autonomy    
Belgium 34.25  97  33.22 
Spain 40.71  67  27.28 
UK 24.15  100  24.15 
Ireland 10.25  100  10.25 
Netherland
s 
7.12 100  7.12 
Germany 54.45  13  7.08 
Austria 51.21  11  5.63 
Norway 45.74  3  1.37 
Australia 32.88  N.A.  N.A. 
France 43.06  N.A.  N.A. 
Sources: Column (A) - IMF Government Financial Statistics, calculated as sample 
averages. 
Column (B) - Estimates for Canada and USA were provided by Jonathan Rodden and are 
based on control of both the tax rate and base, the remaining data are OECD (1999). All 
figures are for 1995. 
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The final grouping we investigate is based upon a measure of borrowing autonomy based 
on Rodden (2002) and reported in Table 6. The ability of any level of government to 
borrow can be helpful in facilitating short-term smoothing, and also perhaps assists in 
safeguarding finance for investment projects. However, threats to fiscal sustainability can 
derive from insufficiently hard budget constraints and a lack of expenditure restraint. 
These macroeconomic considerations lead many central governments to place restrictions 
on the ability of sub-central authorities to borrow, and might be expected to restrict the 
potential responses of the sub-central authorities to cuts in their grant allocations, see 
Pisauro (2001) and Rodden (op. cit.) for more detailed discussions of these issues. 
 
Table 6: Ranking by Borrowing Autonomy 





Norway   1.6 
Ireland 1.75 










Source: Rodden (2003) as adapted in Darby et al., (2003). 
 
 
The key results using these country groupings are summarised in Table 7.   
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Table 7: Summary of Results using Country Groupings 
 









Expenditure on Goods and Services 
Taxation Revenue 
 










   
 
 
Taxation, total expenditure, and expenditures on goods and services all show larger 
responses to grant cuts in countries with high expenditure decentralization
12. Tax 
autonomy seems to be a less important discriminating factor, in that we found few 
significant effects for the countries with greatest tax autonomy in T. Even in countries 
with a relatively high degree of taxation autonomy the evidence of a reverse fly paper 
effect that we have already discussed remains. There is no significant attempt made to 
offset the consequences of lower grants on sub-central expenditure. Finally it appears that 
countries with the greatest borrowing autonomy react to cuts in grants by making larger 
cuts in their total expenditure and in particular in capital spending, relative to their 
reference values. Whilst these countries in principle would appear to be in a stronger 
position to offset the impact of the grant cut there is no evidence that they do so. Even for 








12    In tabulating these effects we focus on the interactive dummies at time T. In some cases, we found that 
the interactive dummies were significant in other time periods. However these effects are difficult to 
explain in terms of institutional features in the country groupings, and seem to be less important.   22
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have examined the behavior of sub-central governments during episodes 
when their grant finance from central government has been cut. We have used event 
analysis to examine not only how sub-central governments react to these adjustment 
episodes, but also to gain information on the time profile of the adjustment. In 
undertaking this analysis we have been able to implement the first comprehensive cross-
national study of how sub-central governments’ react to financial squeezes enacted by 
central government. 
 
The results which emerge are set out in detail in the body of the paper. However, it is 
worth highlighting some general points from our empirical investigation. Our first 
observation is that the burden of adjustment in response to a cut in their grant allocations 
is met by cuts in sub-central expenditure. We observe that across our event window, 
during episodes of grant cuts, expenditures are cut by significant amounts and that such 
cuts appear to be sustained. 
 
The second general theme is that cuts in grants are not generally offset by large and 
persistent increases in sub-central taxation revenues. Overall, the increase in sub-central 
taxation following episodes of cuts in grants tend to be weak, and this, coupled with our 
observations on the expenditure side, offers support for the presence of a reverse 'fly-
paper' effect, although not the asymmetric 'fly-paper effect' suggested by Gramlich 
(1987). 
 
The third general point is that the sub-central wage bill and capital spending are important 
areas of adjustment for sub-central governments following cuts in grants. Although the 
nature of the adjustment does depend to some degree upon the size of the cut in inter-
governmental grant, it is striking that capital spending whilst being a small component of 
sub-central expenditure suffers disproportionately following the centrally imposed   
squeeze. This possibly highlights a degree of short-termism on the part of local 
governments in adjusting their fiscal position. 
 
Finally, even where countries have greater flexibility to offset the centrally imposed cuts, 
through high degrees of expenditure decentralization, tax and borrowing autonomy, they   23
appear unlikely to exercise these powers. Indeed our evidence suggests that the most 
decentralized and autonomous sub-central governments exercise the greatest expenditure 
restraint. We can speculate that the even stronger links between grant cuts and spending 
squeeze in these cases reflect the ease with which the sub-central governments can 
convince their electorate to attribute the blame for the cuts to the centre.  
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DATA APPENDIX  
 
All variables unless otherwise stated are from the IMF GFS [2002] database and are in 
current prices. 
 
Total Expenditure = [All Current Expenditure (including Wages and Salaries, Employer 
Contributions, other Purchases of Goods and Services, Subsidies, Transfers to households 
and Transfers abroad) less Interest Repayments less Transfers to other tiers of national 
government] + [All Capital Expenditure (including acquisition of Fixed Capital Assets, 
Purchases of Stocks, Purchases of Land and Intangible Assets and Capital Transfers) less 
Capital Transfers to other tiers of national government.] 
 
Total revenue = Tax revenue + Non-Tax revenue + Capital Revenue + Grants (total 
grants less grants received from other tiers of national government). 
 
Tax revenue = Income, Corporate and Capital Gains taxation + Social Security 
Contributions + Payroll taxation + Property taxation + Domestic and International 
Indirect taxation. 
 
Non-tax revenue = Entrepreneurial and Property Income + Administrative Fees and 
Charges + Fines and Forfeits + Other Non-tax revenue. 
 
Grants = Grants received from other tiers of national government. Grants received from 
super-national authorities such as the EU are excluded. 
 
Social Transfers = Transfers to households and non-profit organizations + Subsidies to 
firms. 
 
Government Wage Bill = Expenditure on Wages and Salaries. 
 
Purchases of Goods and Services = Non-Wage Expenditure on Goods and Services. 
 
Capital Expenditure = Acquisition of Fixed Capital assets, Purchases of Stocks, Land 
and Intangible Assets + Capital Transfers. 
 
Debt to GDP ratio = Gross National Debt as a percentage of GDP; source OECD 
Statistical Compendium 2002. 
 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product (Expenditure approach) at current prices; source OECD 
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